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abStract
Many people assume that the extinction of humanity would be a bad thing. 
This article scrutinizes this apparent badness and demonstrates that on 
most plausible consequentialist frameworks, the extinction of humanity is 
not necessarily bad. The best accounts of the badness of the extinction of 
humanity focus on the loss of potential utility, but this loss can be offset if 
it is the result of sufficiently large gains by the present generation. Plausible 
means of calculating the goodness of outcomes accordingly suggest 
hastening extinction even in some circumstances where the alternative is 
a long period of human existence at a high level.
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INTRODUCTION
Many fear the potential extinction of humanity due to the common intuition 
that extinction is bad and should be avoided.2 Yet what it means for extinction 
to be ‘bad’ is not obvious. This article scrutinizes the apparent badness of 
extinction. The most plausible candidate explanations for the badness of 
extinction do not rely on extinction itself being bad but on extinction pairing 
with other negative effects or forestalling other potential goods. Not all 
extinction scenarios have these implications. Extinction is not an impersonal 
bad and need not be personally bad even if we grant potential persons some 
moral personhood. Extinction is thus not necessarily bad. Even imminent 
extinction may be preferable to the continued existence of humanity for 
1 Thank you to Derek Parfit and Jeff McMahan for comments on the earliest version 
of this article, which was drafted for their graduate seminar at Rutgers University. Thank 
you also to the other students in that course for thoughtful conversations on many issues 
and to the anonymous reviewers for feedback on more recent drafts.
2 As Larry Temkin notes, “anything…anyone…writes on this topic should be taken 
with a large grain of salt” (2008: 193). It is hard to know what the futures below would look 
like. This may affect intuitions about some cases and the theories used to explain them. 
‘Extinction’ here refers to the extinction of humanity. The argument has implications for 
other extinctions.
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very long periods of time on plausible means of calculating the value of 
outcomes if the extinction is brought about under the right circumstances. 
Once one recognizes that the badness of extinction is reducible to this lost 
potential utility, confidence in the intuition that imminent extinction is a 
bad thing that is to be avoided and/or delayed can be challenged on most 
plausible forms of outcome analysis that take potential utility into account. 
The lost potential utility of even a large number of future generations living 
lives that are worth living could be less than the amount of utility accrued 
by the current generation.3 Extinction scenarios thus do not give one reason 
to choose between competing theories of outcome valuation. 
The argument for these claims consists of six substantive parts. The first 
section assesses competing theories of the good and demonstrates that the 
badness of extinction is reducible to the lost potential utility of future 
generations that could exist but for the extinction (and any negative effects 
on existing persons). The second section briefly canvasses the best means 
of calculating the value of potential utility and outcomes including potential 
utility. I argue that intuitions that extinction is a bad thing to be avoided 
and/or delayed are undermined regardless of which mainstream position 
one takes. On Total-, Average- or Perfection-based analyses, the badness of 
extinction can be outweighed if it takes place as a consequence of an act 
that creates sufficiently good benefits for existing persons. The third and 
fourth sections demonstrate that this is true in cases where there is a choice 
between extinction and humanity continuing to experience lives worth 
living for a short period and cases where the alternative to extinction is 
humanity continuing to exist with very good lives for very long periods. The 
fifth section examines the significance of potential future f lourishing 
generations in the analyses of the badness of outcomes. The final substantive 
section further defends the approach to extinction above by highlighting 
how it explains a separate intuition that the death of the last person is not 
the worst death in the history of humanity.
1. APPROACHES TO VALUING EXTINCTION
The claim that extinction is bad could mean several things. This section 
presents several alternatives and demonstrates weaknesses with many of 
them by way of defending the relative plausibility of a particular view.
The most common view on the value of extinction is probably something like: 
a. Extinction is intrinsically bad.
John Broome helpfully explains the structure of this view (but does not 
3 ‘Utility’ here refers to whatever is valuable in life. Those who are queasy about hedon-
focused Utilitarianism can substitute their own units of measurement.
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defend it) (2012: 180-181). Contrary to (a), however, there are cases where 
many would not want to avoid (even near-term) extinction. All-else-being-
equal, it is implausible to deny that one should choose extinction now over 
a million years of people living lives not worth living. Moreover, this position 
seems confused on terminological grounds. Non-existence has no intrinsic 
features/properties. 
If the badness of extinction is not intrinsic, it is likely tied to its effects 
on the amount of utility that is realized in the world. This raises issues in 
moral mathematics that can be fruitfully explored in extinction cases. One 
type of value assessment appeals to purely person-affecting principles in 
which the goodness and badness of outcomes is determined by their effects 
on persons. The most common response to extinction may be best explained 
by what Derek Parfit calls the Narrow Person-Affecting Principle, according 
to which one of two outcomes cannot be worse if it would be worse for no one 
(1984: 393-395). Common aversive responses to extinction likely stem from 
imagined links between suffering and extinction. In several plausible 
scenarios, painful deaths act as a prelude to full extinction. Common responses 
to such cases support:
b. Extinction is bad because the effects on (including harms to) 
existing persons are sufficiently great to render it bad.
If extinction were to take place as a result of a disaster that brought untold 
suffering with few benefits, (b) would be true. But determining whether 
extinction is necessarily (even comparatively) bad or necessarily includes 
bad-making features requires sifting out contingent facts. Extinction need 
not include such effects on existing persons. An impartial non-human 
observer interested in utility could lament the suffering in (b), but this 
would not entail lamenting the fact of extinction. If the early deaths are the 
price for a shorter period of an extreme well-being greater than the amount 
of well-being expected for any potential extra years of life, it is plausible 
that early death would not harm them. Imagine an extinction case where 
this is true for all existing persons such that no one currently alive is harmed 
by extinction. (b) is false in such circumstances and many others. Further, 
Strict Person-Affecting Views, which calibrate the goodness of outcomes 
using the effects on persons alone, tend to have unintuitive determinations 
about the supposed badness of extinction. On these views, extinction is bad 
iff the sum of utility of existing people lost by the act of extinction is larger 
than the sum of the utility gained. This does not always hold true. Therefore, 
 Offsetting the Harms of Extinction 11
LEAP 3 (2015)
extinction is not always bad here.4
Issues with (b) lead theorists to seek other ways in which extinction is a 
bad thing. One attempt merely modifies the Person-Affecting Principle. This 
implausible approach can be dealt with briefly. The badness of extinction 
is often thought to go beyond its effect on the currently living. Some thus 
suggest that extinction is bad because of its effects on future persons. They 
explain the badness of extinction by extending the scope of the Person-
Affecting Principle to include potential future persons who do not exist 
because humanity goes extinct prior to their birth. On such views, the 
badness of extinction can be calculated by some mixture of the effects on 
existent and potential persons, resulting in views like:
c. Extinction is bad because the effects on potential persons (which 
do not include direct harms) are sufficiently great to render it bad.
and
d. Extinction is bad because the effects on existent and potential 
persons are sufficiently great to render it bad.
These views likely describe the common views of lay persons, but are 
mistaken. At the time of extinction, potential future persons do not exist 
and cannot be harmed in the person-affecting sense.5 If potential persons 
cannot be harmed, future generations are not directly harmed by extinction 
either. It is not, then, enough to appeal to person-affecting principles about 
what might be in or against the interests of presently existing people and 
future people when analyzing outcomes if one wants to salvage the intuition 
that extinction is always bad. The modified Person-Affecting View nonetheless 
hints at an important point: there is reason to take future generations into 
account when making moral decisions today and the sense in which 
future persons are morally relevant explains why we should usually 
avoid/delay extinction.
It is more plausible that the badness of non-existence stems from the 
fact that the history of the world would be better if extinction came later or 
never came about. The badness of extinction is impersonal. Jeff McMahan 
4 Complex Person-Affecting calculi better demonstrate the potential badness of 
extinction. James Lenman (2002) suggests we care about future generations for selfish reasons 
(e.g., joy of knowing about future generations analogous to the joy of having children). This 
construction includes a personal bad, but hardly supports the idea of extinction as an 
impersonal bad whose badness extends beyond its effect on persons. Samuel Scheffler (2013) 
suggests that the badness of extinction partly stems from the way that it negates our ability 
to value and thus destroys utility in the present and future. These contingencies may be 
undermined in some cases below.
5 They will not exist unless we act in certain ways. Slight policy changes produce 
different future persons. Recall Derek Parfit (1984: Chapter 16).
12 Michael Da Silva 
LEAP 3 (2015)
(2013) plausibly ties together this impersonal bad and the potential interests 
of future persons. He suggests that the non-existence of a potential person 
is an impersonal loss. One cannot care for these persons morally for their 
own sake. McMahan nonetheless holds that one has a reason to bring a better 
off person into existence rather than a worse off person, which he suggests 
implies a reason to bring the better off person into existence rather than no 
person at all. To bring a person into existence is to confer a “non[-]
comparative” benefit on him/her (9). Extinction is potentially problematic 
because it forestalls the granting of many non-comparative benefits and 
thus produces a history with less utility than a history in which extinction 
either never takes place or comes much later and non-comparative benefits 
are bestowed on new persons. The most important implication of McMahan’s 
view for the extinction case is that there are impersonal reasons to bring 
people into existence due to the value they will add to the world. The perspective 
of the aforementioned impartial non-human observer interested in utility is 
the best point of view from which one can assess the potential badness of 
extinction. From this perspective, extinction is bad because it forestalls 
potential utility. Potential persons do not lose something by failing to come 
into existence. Instead, if causing people to exist would be good for them, 
their not coming into existence is bad despite not being bad for them.6 If 
these people could have had lives worth living, their non-existence is an 
impersonal loss of value. The lack of benefits is a detriment in the history of 
the world. Comparisons of the utility of worlds with future generations and 
those without them help identify the bad of extinction: potential utility is 
not realized in the world where extinction is earlier. 
One should, then, count the potential future utility of presently non-
existent people when choosing between outcomes. This is not because of a 
duty to potential persons or because existence would be good for them. It 
is because it is comparatively better to have more utility in a given history 
than less utility. All-else-being-equal, it is better to bring about an outcome 
that realizes more of what is now merely potential utility than one that 
realizes less of it. If we count potential harms in our calculus of the 
badness of extinction, two plausible views arise. Given the contingency of 
an extinction scenario harming current individuals, one may adopt a view 
focused on impersonal loss alone:
e. Extinction is comparatively bad if the loss of potential utility that 
would have accrued had the currently living people existed for a longer 
period of time and had other persons lived in the future is greater than 0.
6 Our “moral reason to ensure the existence of future generations is at least in part a 
moral reason to provide, or not to prevent, the enormous benefits of life for the enormous 
number of people who might exist in the indefinite future” (McMahan 1986: 335).
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Yet even the truth of (e) depends on how extinction arises. Those interested 
in utility more broadly should take account of the utility of existing persons 
as well. While the badness of extinction may be reducible to (e), full utility-
based outcome analyses cannot ignore when an outcome includes the 
suffering of current existing persons; contingent suffering is relevant when 
present. The impartial non-human observer cannot ignore it. An alternative 
thus combines person-affecting and impersonal perspectives:
f. Extinction is comparatively bad if the sum of the suffering it imposes 
on living persons, the loss of potential utility that would have accrued 
had the currently living people existed for a longer period of time and 
had other persons lived in the future, or some combination of the two 
is greater than 0.
Richard Kraut, an opponent of absolute/intrinsic value, supports something 
like (f). For Kraut, the extinction of any species is bad iff the loss of the species 
is bad for the Earth’s other creatures (2011: 169). The loss of beings that can 
and do experience and produce more good is worse than the loss of being 
who can and do experience and produce less good (185). Humans, including 
future humans, can experience and produce more good than any other species. 
Thus, the extinction of humanity would be the greatest of all catastrophes (164). 
Like McMahan, Kraut takes future generations into account when assessing 
outcomes. He thereby commits to a view whereby potential utility must 
be weighed in our moral calculations. Both the last generation of humanity 
and their possible beneficiaries in future generations would be negatively 
affected by an extinction scenario, reducing total utility in the world (164-
165). Occasionally, Kraut makes it sound as if future generations could be 
harmed by extinction, but to the extent that he can be plausibly be read as 
endorsing (f), his view appears more plausible than alternatives. 
Extinction scenarios, then, are most likely bad because of their negative 
impact on existing persons (to the extent that such effects are present) and 
because of the loss of the possible goodness of the people who might have 
existed and had good lives. The following explains how to compare the 
values of histories including the potential utility of future persons and how 
plausible calculations still lead to scenarios where extinction today is 
preferable than many years of continued human existence. It thereby 
explains why one should adopt a new approach to the badness of extinction, 
which is introduced in the next section.
2. CALCULATING THE BADNESS OF EXTINCTION
There is, then, a comparative harm in future people failing to come into 
existence if they would experience utility that would not otherwise be realized. 
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This harm is impersonal. If the badness of extinction is comparative and 
its value is exhausted by the loss of potential utility (and perhaps the disutility 
experienced by existing persons when the extinction scenario arises), this 
raises questions about how to calculate potential utility and the overall utility 
of an outcome.
The loss of potential utility stemming from an early extinction is a bad-
making feature of an extinction scenario. Comments on how bad it would 
be are necessarily speculative,7 but an impartial non-human observer would 
likely possess better measurement tools than I do. This piece thus assumes 
determinations on how much potential utility future persons would realize if 
brought into existence can be made, bracketing one source of uncertainty in 
population ethics, uncertainty about value, to assess the badness of extinction. 
One cannot place potential utility valuation completely in a black box, 
but attempts to answer hard questions about such valuation raise several 
problems. Practical decisions rely on information available to modern 
humans, not impartial non-human observers. When comparing potential 
histories, we want to know if, for example, we should discount benefits to 
future persons or if potential utility is equivalent to actual utility (see e.g., 
Bostrom 2002: 15-16). Black boxing may thus be practically problematic. 
For present purposes, however, it suffices to note that the loss of potential 
utility is non-negligibly bad.8 Regardless of how one values potential future 
7 John Broome agrees that we must take potential persons into account (2012: 175). 
The absence of persons accounts for our intuitions about the badness of extinction, even if 
we do not think it can explain why we think extinction is any worse than any other massive 
drop in the potential population. Yet Broome is more skeptical than McMahan about the ultimate 
badness of large absences of persons: 
Intuitively it seems most plausible that…[absences] are bad….But…we still have a lot of 
work to do before we can be sure that this is so….[E]ven if we can be sure a collapse of 
population would be bad, we have no idea how bad it would be. We have empirical work 
to do in predicting what would have been the well-being of the absent people, had they 
lived (183).
This provides reason to question (e), (f), and (g). Broome suggests we cannot be sure of our 
utility calculations and thus may not be able to do the moral mathematics necessary to support 
the views. If this is true, any comments on the value of potential utility, including comments on 
the value of outcomes that rely on potential utility calculi, are necessarily speculative.
8 I am tentatively wont to provide such a discount based solely on the uncertainty 
identified by Broome, but the claim that the badness of extinction can be outweighed by 
other relevant circumstances even when the alternative would be many years of continued 
human existence does not depend on such a discount. E.g., Parfit offers a Two Tier View, 
according to which we give greater weight to the badness of outcomes that would be worse 
for particular people, but give some weight to non-person-affecting good and bad outcomes 
(2011: 219-233). Questions concerning whether extinction is always bad and whether we should 
always attempt to delay it arise even on versions of the Two-Tier View that give significantly 
less weight to effects on future well-being that do not affect particular people.
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utility, it should be included in assessments of the good of outcomes. The 
more pressing concern is how to calculate the overall utility of an outcome 
given fixed inputs of the utility of existing persons and potential utility of 
future persons.9 Two popular candidate principles for such determinations 
are the Total Principle and the Average Principle. The former holds that 
“other things being equal, the best outcome is the one in which there would 
be the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living” (Parfit 1984: 
387), but unfortunately entails the Repugnant Conclusion (388). The latter 
holds that the best scenario is one in which the average amount of utility 
experienced by each person is highest and may have similar implications 
in its widest form (399). It is also subject to further critiques, including the 
Levelling Down Objection (described in Temkin 2012: 75-76).  There is thus 
reason to question the most intuitive Non-Person-Affecting Views. Nearby 
views suffer from similar defects10 and extinction cases like the ones below 
raise similar problems.11 All principles of valuation suffer from some defects 
and are thus not obvious candidates for use in the valuation of the badness 
of extinction.
The following possibility, which is agnostic about the competing principles, 
helps avoid these problems, but also supports the view that extinction is not 
necessarily bad:
g. Extinction is not comparatively bad if the sum of any negative 
disutility experienced in the process bringing about extinction and 
the impersonal negative effects of the potential utility of existent 
and future persons failing to be realized can be negated by earlier 
benefits conferred on existing persons.
The scenarios below suggest followers of Total-, Average- and Perfection-
based outcome valuation principles should all prefer imminent extinction 
9 For simplicity’s sake, calculations here ignore Different People Choices, wherein 
different persons will be born depending on which of two scenarios arise and we assess the 
relative value of their lives (Parfit 1984: 356). The choice is between only this generation existing 
and any future generation existing.
10 Given space limitations, other principles cannot be canvassed. Yet it should be 
reasonably clear that nearby view suffer from similar defects. E.g., those who understand the 
case demonstrating how the Average Principle may lead to Repugnant Conclusion should 
understand how these arguments also apply to the Average Utility Principle. Small differences 
in particular cases are dealt with briefly below. The key is that the treatment of (e)-(g) above 
remains true when reformulated to account for average utility.
11 The Impersonal Total and Average Principles also entail that, under certain 
circumstances, extinction is preferable to long periods of continued human success. Indeed, 
the cases below suggest that extinction may be preferable on any plausible valuations. Given 
the similar problems between these views and their nearby alternatives on the margins, it is 
likely that the total badness in (e) and (f) can be negated by earlier benefits conferred on existing 
persons regardless of whether the loss of utility is calculated in totals or as deviations from 
an average.
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provided that the limit on the amount humans are able to flourish is sufficiently 
high. (g) is thus true regardless of whether one calculates the value of outcomes 
from a Total-, Average- or even Perfection-based perspective.12 Given that 
the most plausible outcome valuation theories all rely on one of these principles, 
one should not choose a theory solely to account for one’s pre-theoretical 
intuitions that extinction is bad and should be avoided or delayed to the 
greatest extent possible. Regardless of whether one assesses the comparative 
badness relative to the possible total sum of utility that would have been 
contained in the lives of people who would have otherwise existed, on their 
quality of life, or some combination of these, imminent extinction may be 
preferable to long continued periods of human existence even at a high level of 
well-being.
This does not entail that extinction is always the better outcome, but only 
that an early extinction may be a better outcome than a later one (from an 
outcome perspective) and a history with extinction in it may be preferable 
to one without it. This is an argument against those who consider extinction 
to be intrinsically bad and argue that it is always the worst, including those 
who say it would be intrinsically worse than humanity’s continuing to exist 
for longer.13 The main arguments for this claim are case-based and appear 
below. Following theories to their logical extremes to derive implausible 
results is common in ethics. I hope to show that any view on valuation may 
have the implausible result that extinction could be preferable to continued 
human instance. This is not meant to be an argument against consequentialism, 
but it should help demonstrate that one should not accept a particular form of 
consequentialism just to avoid the conclusion that extinction is preferable to 
alternatives.14 For instance, McMahan uses the badness of extinction as a 
datum for why one should admit non-comparative benefits, the aforementioned 
benefits that “cannot be explained in counterfactual comparative terms” (2013: 
9), into one’s moral mathematics (26). For McMahan, extinction appears to 
be “the worst of those possible tragedies that have more than a negligible 
12 Perfectionists believe ensuring people have a high quality of life is most important. 
Perfectionism too produces results where extinction is preferable to even long periods of 
continued human existence. E.g., the impartial perfectionist who is only concerned with the 
potential humanity being fully realized may prefer a world in which humanity flourishes to 
the greatest extent possible now even if the non-existence of many future generations who 
would otherwise exist is a necessary consequence.
13 I will not address an extreme view one could read into David Benatar  (2006: 194):
h. Earlier extinction is preferable to a later one because coming into existence is always 
harmful. We are obligated not to harm people and thereby obligated to hasten extinction 
by not procreating.
14 If (g) is true, those who believe that extinction is necessarily bad need to look outside 
utility-based analyses for justification. A rule-based approach to ethics may justify this belief. 
Adopting such an ethics may be the right application of the argument’s conclusion. This piece 
merely seeks to identify implications of utility-based analysis.
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probability of actually occurring”, not merely due to its effects on existing 
persons, but also due to the loss of potential future utility by potential future 
persons (26). Since potential future persons when choices concerning 
extinction are being made, there may be no relevant counterfactual in 
which they are comparatively benefitted or harmed. The purported losses 
of extinction thus appear non-comparative. Extinction produces impersonal 
losses. McMahan’s view’s ability to explain the general plausibility of (e) and 
(f), in which extinction will almost always be at least comparatively bad, 
counts in its favor. The loss of potential value in (e) and (f ) are best 
understood as non-comparative or impersonal. One should not, however, 
assume that (e) and (f) are true. Indeed, even McMahan’s mathematics can 
be used to create a choice scenario where extinction is not the worst outcome. 
Plugging non-comparative harms into (e) and (f) can still result in ‘Extinction 
is bad’ reading false. The badness of extinction alone thus does not justify 
admitting non-comparative benefits and harms into our moral calculations. 
McMahan is aware of other problems with non-comparative benefits and 
harms, but these considerations suggest that the extinction case may not 
provide adequate reason to accept them in the first place. To the extent that 
one prefers one’s intuitions about the badness of extinction to one’s ability 
to make plausible moral calculations, this is a problem with utility-based 
theory. Others should be moved to reconsider their distaste for certain 
imminent extinction scenarios. The remainder of this piece will demonstrate 
that one should not admit the potential utility of future persons into one’s 
moral calculations merely to explain pre-theoretical intuitions about the 
badness of extinction. This is because the addition of these people into our 
moral calculus will not always allow us to maintain these intuitions. Providing 
future individuals with the means to realize their potential utility is good. Since 
this good is merely comparative, however, it is not morally necessary that one 
bring it about in all cases. Since it is impersonal, no one is harmed by failing 
to realize it. When the potential utility calculus is paired with the most plausible 
means for analyzing the overall goodness of outcomes, the loss of potential 
utility of a hastened extinction will not rule out choosing extinction over 
histories where human beings live longer in certain circumstances. Extinction 
today may be preferable to millions of years of continued human existence 
in some circumstances.
3. EASIER CASES
The extinction of humanity, then, is not intrinsically bad and any potential 
negative effects on existent and potential persons can in principle be negated 
by earlier benefits conferred on existing persons. The following cases, 
focused on the use of pills that are unavailable in the physical world but 
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common in philosophy, support the more fundamental first conjunct 
concerning the intrinsic value of extinction. One may prefer a history with 
an earlier extinction to a latter one and a history with extinction in it to an 
alternative without it. Moral mathematics does not always demand choosing 
an outcome that avoids extinction. Nick Bostrom notes that it is not “a 
conceptual truth that existential catastrophes are bad or that reducing 
existential risk is right” (2013: 24). If one is solely concerned with outcomes, 
it also may not be a substantive truth that extinction is necessarily bad. 
Harder cases below suggest early extinction may be preferable to circumstances 
in which humanity survives for a very long time. I first address less contentious 
cases where humanity will only continue to exist somewhat longer.
The supposed badness of extinction is often demonstrated with hypothetical 
scenarios, but such scenarios also undermine this supposed badness. Larry 
Temkin provides an example of a scenario in which mass sterility leads to 
extinction to suggest that an outcome where regular regeneration continues 
is better than one giving current people immortality; contra Jan Narveson,
if we developed a pill enabling each of us to live wonderful lives for 
120 years, it would be terrible for us to take the pill if the cost of doing 
so were the extinction of humanity. This is so even if taking the pill 
were better for each individual who took it, and hence everyone whoever 
lived, collectively….[I]f the cost of immortality would be a world without 
infants and children, without regeneration and rejuvenation, it wouldn’t 
be worth it….[T]his is so even if each immortal would be better off 
than each mortal (2008: 208)15.
Intuitions about similar cases are supposed to demonstrate the badness 
of extinction. Yet I suspect that our intuitions about the case will differ if it 
is altered such that existing persons are made sufficiently well off. Extinction 
may be the worst outcome of a given decision, but if we remove personal 
harms from the scenario, extinction can be personally good. In such 
circumstances, the impersonal loss is merely a function of the lost potential 
utility of future generations that would have otherwise existed. A sufficient 
level of personal good for existing persons could outweigh this loss. 
From a pure outcome perspective, case-based reasoning suggests that 
a history including extinction may be preferable to an indefinitely long 
history without one.16 Imagine a choice between:
15  My thoughts on this topic were furthered by two Temkin-inspired cases in Nick 
Beckstead’s doctoral dissertation (2013: 63). Gregory Kavka provides another famous pill case 
(1982: 98). 
16 These intuitions affirm Lenman’s claim that “[f ]rom an impersonal, timeless 
perspective it is hard to identify good reasons why it should matter that human extinction 
comes later rather than sooner” (2002: 253).
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The Highest High: An intergalactic travelling salesman arrives on 
Earth. The salesman offers the Earth’s inhabitants a pill that allows 
everyone currently alive to reach the highest level of f lourishing 
possible. Infertility is a side effect. The salesman is only on Earth for 
a brief period of time and will not make the offer again, but will only 
provide it to the current generation on the condition that everyone 
agrees to take it. Everyone agrees to take the pill. Humanity goes 
extinct when the last currently alive person dies.17
Rejecting the Offer 1: The intergalactic travelling salesman makes his 
offer, but it is rejected. Humanity continues to develop, but extinction 
comes within a few hundred years due to natural circumstances.
Rejecting the Offer 2: The intergalactic travelling salesman makes his 
offer, but it is rejected. Humanity development plateaus due to unforeseen 
technological problems. Extinction comes within a few hundred years 
due to the natural circumstances from Rejecting the Offer 1.
Return to the Repugnant Conclusion: The intergalactic travelling 
salesman makes his offer, but it is rejected. Human development 
regresses. A large number of humans continue to exist for an indefinite 
period of time with lives barely worth living.
The pill’s extraterrestrial origin removes contingencies in other pill 
cases.18 Many of the worries surrounding extinction are also removed. 
Preferences can be satisfied. Voluntariness is not undermined. Even the 
violent ends of the last generation that add to the badness of extinction in 
similar scenarios are not present.19 Most forms of uncertainty are removed 
from the comparative equation. The possible outcomes are stipulated to 
identify whether one with the extinction of humanity in it is necessarily 
17 For simplicity’s sake, assume that the last people die together, everyone enjoys full 
material comforts, and no family members see each other suffer. This avoids pains in Lenman 
(2002: 255).
18 In the absence of an ‘all or nothing’ decision on whether to take the pill, it is best to 
delay taking it until either scientists develop it without the sterility side effect or it is clear 
that the side effect could not be remedied. It remains important to determine whether 
extinction following flourishing is problematic rather than focusing on when one can know 
the following periods will not be better. If the side effect could not be remedied, the case 
would be akin to the extraterrestrial introduction in all relevant respects.
19 Lenman provides a famous example of such a scenario and poses two questions: 
Suppose it is written in The Book of Fate that one day we will be wiped out in a nasty 
catastrophe. Many millions of people will die in terrifying circumstances involving great 
pain and distress. The only thing the Book of Fate is silent about is when this is going to 
happen….The question is – Should we care? Does it matter how soon this happens? (2002: 255).
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worse than the alternatives.20 It is not obvious that The Highest High is the 
worst scenario. It is thus not obvious that extinction sooner rather than later 
is necessarily a bad outcome. Human beings’ ability to flourish could be 
limited by their nature and psychology. If so, a relatively small number of 
future generations existing below the limit may produce a larger number of 
positive benefits than the pill. If, however, the level of f lourishing is 
sufficiently high, then The Highest High creates more utility than Rejecting 
the Offer 1 and 2. It thus appears to be the preferable outcome. 
The choice above may be a mere choice between existential risks,21 but 
this does not undermine the broader implications of the example. When 
compared with Return to the Repugnant Conclusion, the mere presence of 
extinction in the Rejecting the Offer scenarios does not make the situation 
worse than an alternative without it in any substantial way.22 Nick Beckstead 
(2013) is likely right that a given period with people in it is better than a 
period without sentient life, but the preceding choice scenario suggests 
that the disvalue of empty periods can be outweighed by sufficiently good 
periods when we look only at histories.
4. HARDER CASES
One may charge that the important comparison involves not just a few more 
centuries, but a much longer survival of humanity. Parts of Parfit’s Reasons 
and Persons (1984) and other influential works in population ethics assume 
that the human race could continue to exist for a long time.23 They then 
question whether an earlier extinction would be preferable to such long 
histories. Even those who prefer the Highest High to Rejecting the Offers 1 
and 2 would likely find it less obviously preferable to a future where human 
beings continue to live for longer periods.
20  Broome’s uncertainty about value potentially remains. This lingering uncertainty 
about the extent to which things are good or bad is no worse than what we find in any other 
scenario. Even Broome notes that expected value theory will not help with this uncertainty 
(2012: 184).
21  E.g., Rejecting the Offer 2 includes a long period of stagnation (which is not Nick 
Bostrom’s “permanent stagnation” (2013: 20) since extinction occurs).
22  One may argue that this would result in a decrease in morally relevant diversity, 
but a fully realized human contributes to diversity in the history, resulting in a tradeoff of 
the loss of diversity. There is reason to question the long-term relevance of this diversity criterion 
even in the absence of that tradeoff. As Lenman argues (2002: 255), it seems more important 
that humanity exist at some point in a history to contribute to diversity than for it to continue 
to exist indefinitely. Diversity could be a bad-making feature of extinction at any given time, 
but if we take a sufficiently impartial view and analyze outcomes of whole histories, it is no 
longer relevant. Diversity over a history may additionally benefit from humans failing to exist 
if some species can only exist where humans do not.
23  Bostrom suggests this is an issue with many existential risks (2013: 22).
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It is important to examine these harder cases comparing early extinction 
to a history where humans continue to live for longer periods. Yet the only 
fundamental difference where one is using the most plausible outcomes 
valuations is that the amount of utility the current generation would need 
to experience to make imminent extinction preferable is much higher than 
it is in the easy cases. Even if we grant that the loss of potential persons 
could make a history worse, extinction is not worse than even alternatives 
where humans continue to live even very good lives for thousands or even 
millions of years if it came about as a consequence of existing people being 
guaranteed lives that were very much better.
Consider:
Rejecting the Offer 3: The scenario in Rejecting the Offer 1 takes place 
but thousands of years pass before the extinction of the human race 
due to natural circumstances.
Rejecting the Offer 4: The scenario in Rejecting the Offer 2 takes place 
but thousands of years pass before the extinction of the human race 
due to natural circumstances.
Given a sufficiently long period of time, one may plausibly believe that 
the gains in quantity of lives in these outcomes when compared with the 
Highest High would be outweighed by the lower quality of people’s lives. 
Much longer time periods make hastened extinction less compelling.24 If 
one accepts Beckstead’s claim that “it is not absurd to consider the possibility 
that civilization continues for a billion years, until the Earth becomes 
uninhabitable” (43), Rejecting the Offer 3, in which humans continue to 
develop, or Rejecting the Offer 4, where human development plateaus, could 
be plausible constructions of these long histories.25
Variations on Rejecting the Offers 3 and 4 suggest that extinction should 
often be avoided, but, given certain assumptions, the Highest High may still 
be preferable. From an outcome-based perspective, extinction should be 
avoided where the positive benefits of an act that will result in or hasten 
extinction will not outweigh the loss of potential utility of future generations. 
For any given comparison with a potential future, one should focus on the 
potential utilities of future histories. To determine whether the Highest High 
is preferable to Rejecting the Offers 3 and 4, one must be able to calculate 
the total amount of utility in each. Whether the Highest High will outweigh 
24  One may worry that these additional numbers will eventually lead to Return to the 
Repugnant Conclusion. The structure of Rejecting the Offers 3 and 4 ensures a relatively 
high amount of well-being in both scenarios. I nonetheless discuss this concern below.
25  Return to the Repugnant Conclusion is unlikely. Broome says “we cannot reduce 
the chance of extinction to zero” (2012: 179). Richard Kraut agrees (2011: 163). They are 
likely right.
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Rejecting the Offers 3 and 4 depends in part on what ‘the highest level of 
flourishing possible’ in the Highest High means. It is easy to see how, all-
else-being-equal, much longer periods of time will create much greater 
amount of utility over the history of humanity. Rejecting the Offers 3 and 4 
thus include more utility than Rejecting the Offers 1 and 2 respectively. 
Whether they will include more utility than the Highest High is not obvious. 
It is natural to assume that we will eventually reach a point where the amount 
of time is sufficient long that even a much smaller amount will sum (or even 
average) to a higher amount than the pill in the Highest High could possibly 
reach. Return to the Repugnant Conclusion is supposed to make this clear. 
In cases where extinction will eventually take place, albeit millions of years 
later, the question of whether more people experiencing less good for longer 
periods of time includes more utility than everyone alive today experiencing 
the highest amount of utility possible depends on how much utility the 
present generation could enjoy. It is hard to imagine ‘indefinite utility’ that 
could offset any potential lesser good in the future. There likely is a limit to 
the amount of utility any person could experience, but (g) remains true 
where the alternative history extends for thousands or even millions of 
years iff the limit on the amount of utility currently existing persons could 
accrue is sufficiently high that they could accrue more utility than many 
future generations. If the limit is sufficiently high, it may be such that the 
good current persons get from taking the pill is greater than thousands, 
millions or even billions of years of existence in any of the four Rejecting 
the Offer scenarios. 
If the gap between present utility levels and our maximal utility levels is 
sufficiently high and one is only interested in choosing between better 
outcomes, then, one may choose the Highest High over Rejecting the Offers 
3 and 4. Given what we know about human physiology and psychology, the 
gap between humanity’s current utility level and the maximum amount we 
could enjoy is likely insufficiently large to offset millions of years at current 
or even lesser levels of utility. But imagine a pill that brings us beyond our 
current maximal capacity such that the highest level of utility is beyond 
current human limitations and results in each of us experiencing bliss 
much greater than the cumulative well-being of hundreds of persons at our 
current level living long lives. If this is the pill on offer in the Highest High, 
humanity would not err in collectively agreeing to take it on risk of sterility. 
Even if humanity would continue to develop such that future generations 
would flourish much more than we do today, experiencing goods far beyond 
our current capacities, a pill that could take existing persons beyond that 
level and provide the maximal amount of utility possible could produce 
more utility provided that the maximal amount of utility possible is 
sufficiently high.
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One may suggest that beings who took that pill would no longer be 
recognizably human. The pill would then result in the immediate extinction 
of humanity by another name. Yet most theorists agree that any history of 
humanity that will continue for thousands, let alone millions, of years needs 
to appeal to human beings’ descendants (e.g., Beckstead 2013: 43). The 
relevant comparison thus assumes we are dealing with beings that may 
not be recognizably human (but are closely related). While some will reject 
this assumption, it is sufficiently pervasive to support my demonstration 
that there is a way of understanding the Highest High that makes it preferable 
to Rejecting the Offers 3 and 4.26 
If the limit of human flourishing is sufficiently low, the Highest High may 
not be preferable to different Rejecting the Offer scenarios. Eventually there 
will be a long enough period of time that will make rejecting the pill 
necessary given a sufficiently long period of time and some cap on the highest 
level of utility possible. A problem for this salvation of anti-extinction-based 
intuitions nonetheless threatens. Perhaps any time extension of this sort 
would create a gap between the level of well-being of pill takers and future 
generations such that the scenario would mirror Return to the Repugnant 
Conclusion in certain respects. The idea that a world with more persons 
who are less well-off could be better than a world that has a smaller but still 
considerably large number of persons (and, indeed, more than enough for 
society to function) who are much better off strikes many as implausible, 
but the source of the repugnance of the repugnant conclusion is hotly 
debated. The Repugnant Conclusion seems to demonstrate that, once a 
sufficient number of persons exist, the aim should not merely be to ensure 
more people exist, but also to ensure that each person experiences a certain 
level of well-being. Given that the persons in both worlds are living lives worth 
living, the problem cannot be that the level of well-being in either world is too 
low in an absolute sense. The repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion only 
occurs in comparative analyses. One explanation for it is that the gap in 
well-being between persons in the first possible world and those in the 
other is too large to be justifiable. The gap in quality of life across worlds 
makes the creation of lives worth living seem repugnant even when the lives 
would otherwise be worth living. If Return to the Repugnant Conclusion is 
problematic not because of the much lower amount of well-being allotted 
26 Depending on how one individuates species, it is possible that Beckstead’s multiple 
phases of humanity/post-humanity will contribute to diversity more than the instant 
development of the pill in the Highest High. One may argue that this would be a further 
bad-making feature of extinction in this circumstance that is not adequately covered by 
utility calculations. Even if one grants that the manner of species individuation that would 
undermine my position is correct, it is possible that the number of species that could flourish 
in the absence of humanity would be greater than the number of post-human species. Such 
speculation should be examined elsewhere.
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to each person in the world with more persons as such, but because it is much 
lower than what we take to be acceptable, perhaps a sufficiently high level 
of maximal utility could make existence even at the a very good level seem 
repugnant compared to the blissful level produced by taking the pill. Even 
the existence of many more persons for a long period of time at a current 
level of well-being may seem repugnant when one compares the quality of 
life at the blissful level with the quality of life at our current levels of well-
being. Rejecting the Offer 4, where human development plateaus, seems 
particularly problematic here, though development at a slow enough pace 
in Rejecting the Offer 3 could also be worrisome. I suspect that the comparative 
explanation for the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion is the wrong 
tack, but the fact that the lives in Return to the Repugnant Conclusion are 
worth living makes the claim that they are absolutely, rather than 
relatively, bad implausible. Defenders of Rejecting the Offers 3 and/or 4 need to 
explain why we prefer the Highest High to Return to the Repugnant 
Conclusion without appealing to the large gap in the relative well-being of 
persons across the scenarios or risk a similar gap in the relative well-being 
of persons in the Highest High and Rejecting the Offers 3 and 4 undermining 
their position. The badness of extinction is still not as obvious as it seemed.
If we can limit the maximal amount of utility that could be brought about 
by the pill, lengthen the amount of time in the Rejecting the Offer scenarios 
to a sufficiently long period that the total utility in the scenario would be 
greater than that amount, and explain why Return to the Repugnant 
Conclusion is worse than the Highest High without appealing to a comparison 
that is mirrored by any Rejecting the Offer scenario and the Highest High, 
then it is easy to construct scenarios where even one who is only concerned 
with total utility in an outcome should refuse to take the pill. The number 
of conditions here would, however, likely surprise many. Laypersons likely 
believe their intuitions that hastening extinction is a bad thing will survive 
most scenarios. This jolt to intuitions strengthens the claim that the Highest 
High reveals a non-obvious truth about the badness of extinction on outcome-
based analyses: it is comparative and can be offset.
5. POSSIBLE FUTURE GENERATIONS WHO WOULD GREATLY FLOURISH
If Beckstead’s speculation about the future is correct, however, it is more 
likely that anyone who will approach the blissful level will do so through a 
gradual process of development (like in Rejecting the Offer 3). The intergalactic 
salesman is unlikely to arrive soon. Even if s/he could exist, it is likely that 
s/he will only visit in a far future in which we can communicate with 
extraterrestrials and interstellar commerce can be done efficiently. It is more 
likely that the highest level of flourishing will require continued technological 
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development.27 It is, in other words, unlikely that we will flourish more than 
any potential future generation that could exist. 
It is thus worth considering what we should believe about the possible 
existence of people whose lives would be vastly better than the lives of the 
most fortunate actual people, but a few comments will have to suffice here. 
If an impartial observer knew that the Highest High would take place 1,000,000 
years from now, then, all-else-being-equal (e.g., assuming there are no periods 
where everyone has lives that are not worth living in the interim), s/he would 
have reason to prefer a history that lasted that long. 
Consider:
Weak Batch: The pill from the Highest High is offered to humanity in 
a diluted form that will only bring the existent generation up to level 
of the best life anyone is currently living. The salesman says s/he could 
provide a better batch in the future that would bring a future generation 
up to the Highest High. Ingesting the weak batch now will produce 
infertility that would make such a trip useless. Humanity takes the 
weak batch.
The value calculations above suggest humanity should not take a pill that 
could raise all existing persons up to the level of the best currently existing 
persons with the same infertility side effect as the pill in the Highest High if 
it knows that a much higher level of flourishing could be experienced by a 
future generation. The future generation would not be harmed by not being 
able to take the pill, but the history of the world would be worse if they were 
given the opportunity. Even a massive boost in well-being for the current 
generation beyond what anyone experiences today cannot justify hastening 
extinction to an earlier date. A ‘Stronger Batch’ situation produces the same 
result. From an impartial perspective, the current generation has no 
special standing.
Yet more interesting questions arise when we contemplate future periods 
of great levels of flourishing below the maximal level in the Highest High. 
Consider:
Good Times Ahead: Development in Rejecting the Offer 3 creates a 
period of overwhelming positive utility in the future, much higher than 
27 Bostrom posits a Technological Completion Conjecture: “If scientific and technological 
development efforts do not effectively cease, then all important basic capabilities that could be 
obtained through some possible technology will be obtained” (2009: 190). One can imagine a 
version that brings humanity to its highest level of flourishing. Given certain technological 
developments, we may reach a point where humanity’s highest ends can be realized even 
without the intervention of an intergalactic traveler. If reaching this point requires sterility 
and we know this side effect is unavoidable, the choice scenario is similar to that of the 
intergalactic traveler. This piece provides guidance on how to make that choice. See note 18.
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the level any human experiences today.
The forgoing provides the tools necessary to decide whether one should 
prefer this to the Highest High. If its “overwhelming utility” is greater than 
one would get by taking the pill, Good Times Ahead is preferable to the Highest 
High. If the maximal level of utility in the Highest High is sufficiently high 
and the “overwhelming positive utility” in Good Times Ahead is less than 
the maximal level, it is possible that the gap is such that even the addition 
of other periods could not result in utility at the level of the Highest High. 
The Highest High would thus be preferable.
6. EXPLAINING ANOTHER INTUITION
Extinction, then, is not bad in certain circumstances on most plausible 
outcome-based analyses. This helps explain common intuitions about the 
relative badness of the deaths of the last person and others. Many do not 
think the death of the last person is worse than the death of others who 
preceded him/her. The fact that one death would bring about the extinction 
of humanity is not seen as conclusive proof that it is worse than others. The 
simplest explanation for this intuition that does not run afoul of other 
plausible ethical stances is that the outcome of this death, extinction, is 
not worse than the outcome of other deaths where other persons remain. 
The intuition about the relative badness of deaths is most easily raised 
when comparing the death of the last human and the death of the human 
immediately preceding him/her. It is stronger where we imagine that the 
last humans know each other. Many people do not believe that the last human 
death would be worse than the penultimate human death. The penultimate 
death may even be worse since the last person will mourn the penultimate 
person’s death in the circumstances, if s/he knew that person, and then live 
alone without interpersonal connections that provide most of life’s meaning. 
S/he could be deeply affected by the death of the penultimate person even 
if s/he did not know the penultimate person, but only knew of his/her 
existence. Samuel Scheffler “would choose not to live on as the only human 
being on earth even if the alternative were not that human society would 
survive after my death but rather that everyone including me would die…
[This preference most importantly] reflects the strongly social character of 
human valuing” (2013: 80). This claim is supposed to be evidence for the 
badness of extinction, but can support the claim that the death of the last 
human may not be the worst one. For Scheffler, knowledge of imminent 
extinction renders one’s life plans meaningless and one’s projects valueless. 
One’s current values are likewise tied to the existence of other persons at 
the same time. We need other people to value our lives. If Scheffler is right, 
the death of the last person is less bad than the death of second last person. 
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Desires to ensure that one last person remains alive, even indefinitely, are 
thus curious.
The fact that the last and penultimate persons are among the last members 
of society obscures a larger truth: we often think that the fact that the last 
person alive is the last person alive does not make his death any worse than 
the death of many, and perhaps even any, other persons. The mere fact that 
s/he was the last person in existence does not make his/her life any more 
valuable than another. Barring circumstances in which the person’s status 
as the last person was the result of virtues fully in his/her command, we 
often think that this status is arbitrary and could easily be otherwise. If 
this is the case, there is little reason to mourn his/her death any more than 
we would mourn the death of an equally valuable contributor to society 
today. The claim that the deaths are not worse than one another is slightly 
different from the claim that there is no reason to mourn one more than 
the other. The latter claim is trivially true if we consider mourning to be a 
strictly post hoc determination: there is by definition no one to mourn the 
last person on Earth after his/her death. We must instead examine the 
former question in an ex ante manner and compare which of two deaths we 
would prefer not to take place in certain circumstances. This determination 
is similar to one on which death is worse all-things-considered from the 
standpoint of the impartial observer judging outcomes. Many think neither 
death is worse than the other. Some believe that the death of the last person 
on Earth is better than the death of earlier persons in certain circumstances.
The easiest explanation for these intuitions, treating one death as worse 
than the other seems arbitrary, is not the best explanation. The relative 
badness of the deaths of two persons who are otherwise the same should 
not be determined by the order of their death. Reversing the order seems 
morally irrelevant. Intuitions about the relative badness of the deaths of 
the last and penultimate persons thus cannot be fully explained by the 
irrelevance of the moral order of actions. The order of actions affects their 
independent moral status elsewhere.28 This could be true where the order 
otherwise seems to be an arbitrary distinguishing mark between two 
cases. The best explanation for intuitions supporting the view that the 
death of the last human on Earth is sometimes no worse than and even 
preferable to earlier human deaths is simply that sometimes the later 
death is preferable despite bringing about the extinction of a species. In 
other words, the best explanation is that the ultimate outcome of extinction is 
preferable to an alternative in which persons continue to live in limited 
circumstances. (g) helps explain intuitions about the relative badness of 
28  McMahan plausibly argues that “the order does make a difference” in determining 
the permissibility of certain actions in the domain of abortion and prenatal injury (2006: 649).
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deaths without appealing to questionable claims about the moral irrelevance 
of the order of actions. This provides further reason to accept it.
CONCLUSION
The extinction of humanity, then, is not intrinsically bad and might be 
comparatively bad only by being an absence of what would have been good. 
This absence can be outweighed by current goods. Thus, the extinction of 
humanity is not always worse than alternative possible futures. Even the 
imminent extinction of humanity may be preferable to the continued 
existence of humanity for long periods of time at high levels of well-being on 
most plausible valuations of outcomes provided that extinction takes a certain 
form. Methodologically, then, one should not choose a means of valuing 
outcomes merely to avoid imminent extinction. Extinction may be preferable 
in certain circumstances regardless of what view ones takes. The insights here, 
then, have methodological value. They should also help clarify why extinction 
should not be hastened now and when it may not be the worst outcome.
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